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Abstract
ASPIC+ is an established general framework
for argumentation and non-monotonic reason-
ing. However ASPIC+ does not satisfy the non-
contamination rationality postulates, and moreover,
tacitly assumes unbounded resources when demon-
strating satisfaction of the consistency postulates.
In this paper we present a new version of ASPIC+
– Dialectial ASPIC+ – that is fully rational under
resource bounds.
1 Introduction
Context. Dung’s seminal argumentation theory [Dung, 1995]
enables formalisation of single agent, and distributed (dialog-
ical), non-monotonic reasoning in terms of the exchange of
arguments. ASPIC+ is a widely used general framework for
defining the arguments and defeats that comprise a Dung Ar-
gumentation Framework (AF ) [Modgil and Prakken, 2013].
Arguments are constructed from a knowledge base (KB) of
formulae in some logical language, and defeasible and strict
inference rules; the latter typically encoding inference in a
deductive logic. Attacks are defined between arguments, and
a preference relation over arguments decides which attacks
succeed as defeats. The claims of the winning (justified) ar-
guments (under Dung’s semantics) define the non-monotonic
inferences from the underlying KB. ASPIC+ allows consid-
erable degrees of freedom in the choice of the logical lan-
guage, the defeasible and strict inference rules, and how pref-
erences are defined. Hence it is shown (see review in [Mod-
gil and Prakken, 2018]) to capture other argumentation for-
malisms, provide dialectical characterisations of well known
non-monotonic logics (e.g., (Prioritised) Default Logic and
Preferred Subtheories), and enable formulation of novel non-
monotonic logics (e.g., [Dong et al., 2019]).
ASPIC+ specifies guidelines that constrain the above
choices, so guaranteeing rational outcomes when evaluat-
ing justified arguments; in particular consistency and clo-
sure [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]. However, two key lim-
itations of ASPIC+preclude its use in providing dialectical
characterisations of non-monotonic reasoning for real world
agents reasoning as individuals or via dialogue. Firstly, con-
sistency is satisfied under the tacit assumption that agents
have unbounded resources (logical omniscience is assumed
in that all deductive inferences are assumed to be generated).
Secondly, guidelines for satisfying the ‘non-contamination’
postulates [Caminada et al., 2012] are not specified. Hence,
inferences (the claims of justified arguments) may be in-
validated by adding syntactically disjoint information to the
premises. This is particularly problematic when evaluating
arguments under the computationally feasible grounded se-
mantics which (sceptically) identifies a unique set of non-
monotonic inferences.
Contributions. This paper is the first to provide a formali-
sation of ASPIC+ – Dialectical ASPIC+ (D-ASPIC+) – that
is fully rational under resource bounds: consistency, clo-
sure and non-contamination are satisfied, while making only
minimal (i.e., relatively undemanding) assumptions as to the
resources available for constructing arguments. Hence, D-
ASPIC+represents an important step towards enabling de-
ployment of argumentation formalisms and non-monotonic
logics in real-world settings by resource bounded agents,
while satisfying the full gamut of rationality criteria.
Outline of Paper. In Section 3 we formalise the D-ASPIC+
framework for structured argumentation. We adapt the ap-
proach in [D‘Agostino and Modgil, 2018], which establishes
rationality under resource bounds for classical logic argumen-
tation. D-ASPIC+refines an argument’s ontology to reflect
the distinction in real-world dialectical uses of argument, be-
tween arguments that an agent commits to, and those that are
supposed (conceded) for the sake of argument (and that an
interlocutor may commit to in dialogical contexts). Unlike
ASPIC+, consistency and closure hold without assuming full
deductive inferential capabilities, or assuming that preference
relations satisfy any properties. Moreover, D-ASPIC+ solves
the foreign commitment problem [Caminada et al., 2014].
Section 4 then identifies the conditions – properties of pref-
erences relations and assumptions on available resources for
constructing arguments – under which D-ASPIC+ satisfies
non-contamination. Section 5 highlights other works aiming
at full rationality for restricted versions of ASPIC+. We also
point to future work: we propose that strict inferences in ar-
guments be generated by proof theories which do not licence
use of ‘redundant’ (syntactically disjoint) premises (e.g., the
natural deduction system in [D‘Agostino et al., 2019]). In so
doing, non-contamination is then satisfied irrespective of the
properties of preference relations.
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2 ASPIC+and its Limitations.
An ASPIC+ argumentation system (AS) hL; ;R; ni con-
sists of some logical language L that includes the constant
symbol ? (falsum), and a function   : L 7! 2L specifying
when formulae are in conflict:
 ' is a contrary of  if ' 2  ,  =2 ' (e.g., 8 2 L; ' is a
contrary of NOT ', where NOT is ‘negation as failure’);
 ' is a contradictory of  (denoted by ‘' =   ’), if
' 2  ,  2 ' (e.g., 8' 2 L, ' and :' are contradictories).
R = Rs [ Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd)
inference rules of the form '1, . . . , 'n ! ', respectively
'1, . . . , 'n ) ' (' 6= ?) where 'i; ' are meta-variables
ranging over wff in L. Typically, strict rules encode inference
in some deductive logic, e.g.,
'1, . . . , 'n ! ' 2 Rs iff '1, . . . , 'n `CL ',
in which case we may simply write Rs = `CL
(`CL is the consequence relation of classical logic).
Defeasible rules typically specify domain-specific defeasible
(default) inferences (e.g., bird(X) ) fly(X)). n is a par-
tial function assigning names (formulae in L) to defeasible
inference rules. Then, any argument concluding a contrary
or contradictory of , invalidates use of the defeasible rule r
named  (and so attacks an argument X that uses r).
An ASPIC+ theory T = (AS;K) consists of an argumen-
tation system and a knowledge base K  L n f?g consisting
of two disjoint subsets Kn (the axiom premises) and Kp (the
ordinary premises). Kn represents infallible information
and/or axioms in some deductive logic, and Kp fallible
information. In this paper we assume any T satisfies only
two of the five conditions identifying ‘well defined’ theories
in [Modgil and Prakken, 2013]: 1) the axiom premises
are consistent, and 2) whenever ' is a contrary of  then
 =2 Kn and  is not the consequent of a strict rule (e.g.,
NOT' cannot be an axiom or conclusion of a strict rule).
We additionally assume that the following is satisfied byRs:
if ' =   then '; ! ? 2 Rs
ASPIC+ arguments are upside down trees, whose leaves are
premises, yielding the argument’s claim (the root node) via
application of strict and/or defeasible rules. In this paper, the
defeasible, but not strict, rules are explicitly represented as
nodes. Figures 1i–iii show such arguments. (In each caseRs
= `CL and Kn = ;.). Application of defeasible rules is indi-
cated by dashed lines (note that ‘’ denotes material impli-
cation). Application of strict rules is indicated by unbroken
lines linking the rule’s conclusion to its antecedents. In i),
we assume arguments built from Kp = fk; r;:p; q  :s; tg
and Rd = fk; r ) p; t ) sg). In ii) and iii), Kp =
fe; sg, Rd = fe ) :sg and Kp = fg; e; sg, Rd = fg )
p; e ) :sg respectively. We may write arguments as lists
of premises and defeasible rules preceding a claim (e.g., A =
[k; r; k; r ) p;:p; q  :s] : :s in Fig. 1i.
The sub-arguments of an argument X (denoted Sub(X))
are the sub-trees ofX , each of whose root node is a node inX
other than a defeasible rule. In Fig. 1i, Sub(A) = A;A1:::6,
and the proper sub-arguments of A are A1:::6. Note that
we may also represent an argument by its top rule (the last
rule applied to obtain the argument’s claim), and with its im-
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Figure 1: ASPIC+arguments.
mediate proper sub-arguments substituing for the rule’s an-
tecedents; e.g., A = A1; A2; A3 ! :s. Also, any X 0 2
Sub(X) such that X 0’s top rule is defeasible or X 0 is an ordi-
nary premise, is said to be a fallible sub-argument of X .
An argumentX attacks Y on Y 0 2 Sub(Y ), if the claim 
of X is a contrary or contradictory of: i) an ordinary premise
Y 0 (an undermine attack), or ii) conclusion of a defeasible
rule that is the top rule of Y 0 (a rebut attack), or iii) the
name (n(r)) of the defeasible rule r that is the top rule of
Y 0 (an undercut attack). If X undermine or rebut attacks
Y on Y 0, then in the case that the claim  is a contradictory
of its target, X defeats Y on Y 0 only if X  Y 0, where 
is a strict partial preference ordering over arguments. Else
undercut attacks and attacks targeting contraries, succeed as
defeats irrespective of preferences (e.g., when X claims ,
the contrary of an ordinary premise Y 0 = [NOT] :  2
Sub(Y )).
One can then define the extensions of a Dung AF (A; )
consisting of an ASPIC+theory’s arguments A and defeats
(  AA). A set S of arguments is admissible if it is con-
flict free (8X;Y 2 S: X 6 Y ) and defends all its arguments
(8X 2 S, 8Y s.t. Y  X , 9Z 2 S s.t. Z  Y ). An ad-
missible set S is: complete if every argument defended by S
is in S; grounded/preferred if it is the smallest, respectively
a largest (under set inclusion), complete extension; stable if
8X =2 S, 9Y 2 S s.t. Y  X .
Limitations of ASPIC+. The consistency postulate [Cam-
inada and Amgoud, 2007] states that no complete extension
should contain arguments with claims ' and  such that
' 2  . ASPIC+is shown to satisfy consistency ([Modgil and
Prakken, 2013]) if  is ‘reasonable’ (i.e.,  satisfies certain
properties as illustrated below), and under the tacit assump-
tion that arguments are constructed given unlimited resources
for generating all deductive inferences encoded in the strict
rules. For example, if Rs = `CL, then in general there will
be an infinite number of arguments. Moreover first order clas-
sical logic is undecidable; even in the propositional case de-
ciding whether  `CL  is in general NP-hard, and therefore
most likely intractable. This is clearly unfeasible for agents
with limited resources. To illustrate, suppose Rs = `CL and
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Kp = fp; p  :q; p  qg. Note that attacks cannot target
conclusions of strict rules (else this would result in violation
of strict closure and indirect consistency rationality postulates
[Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]). Hence, to ensure that no
complete extensionE containsX and Y in Fig.1iv, one needs
to assume resources suffice to additionally constructA and B
and C. Then, if is reasonable (i.e., A  [p  :q] : p  :q
or B  [p  q] : p  q or C  [p] : p), at least one of the at-
tacks from A, B or C succeeds as a defeat. Hence, defending
against any such defeat requires some Z 2 E that defeats A
or B or C, which necessarily implies that Z defeats either X
or Y , contradicting E is conflict free and so complete.
Non-contamination [Caminada et al., 2012] may be vio-
lated by ASPIC+ if an argument makes use of inconsistent
premises and/or rules, or premises/rules that are redundantly
used in deriving a claim.
Firstly, suppose Rs = `CL, Kp = fq  :s; tg and Rd =
ft ) sg. Clearly B in Fig. 1i is in the grounded extension.
But upon adding fk; r;:pg and fk; r ) pg to Kp and Rd,
which intuitively are irrelevant to deciding the status of B
(by virtue of being syntactically disjoint from t and t ) s),
then A in (Fig. 1i) attacks B. Assuming  = ;, A defeats B.
One can easily verify thatB is now no longer in the grounded
extension. The ‘inconsistent’ A is said to be ‘contaminating’.
Secondly, suppose in Fig. 1ii that C  F so that F defeats
C but not vice versa. F = [s] : s is in the grounded exten-
sion. Suppose one adds to the underlying theory the irrelevant
(syntactically disjoint) g and g ) p, additionally yielding D
in Fig. 1iii. If D  F , then although F still defeats C, D
and F defeat each other. F is no longer in the grounded ex-
tension. C has been contaminated by the redundant g and
g ) p, by virtue of the classical inference p; e `CL e.
3 Dialectical ASPIC+
In providing a resource bounded fully rational account of
ASPIC+, we begin by observing that a common dialectical
move is to commit to some arguments and their claims, ar-
guing that if one supposes for the sake of argument the ar-
guments and claims of an interlocutor, then  is necessarily
(strictly) entailed. Hence, a D-ASPIC+ argument differen-
tially labels the ‘maximal fallible subarguments’ (mfs) of an
ASPIC+argument A, according to whether they are commit-
ted or supposed for the sake of argument:
Definition 1. An ASPIC+argument A is a D-ASPIC+ argu-
ment iff exactly one of L1: : :L4 hold:
L1: A = [] : ,  2 Kp and A is exclusively labelled with
either c (for ‘committed’) or s (for ‘supposed’)
L2: A = [] : ,  2 Kn
L3 A = A1; : : : ; An ) ' and A is exclusively labelled with
either c or s
L4: A = A1; . . . , An ! ' and each Ai is a D-ASPIC+
argument,1 and:
C1 8A0 2 Sub(A), A0 is not labelled with c and s
1That is, traversing each path from the root (conclusion) to a
leaf of an ASPIC+argument A, assign label c or s when first en-
countering either an ordinary premise or conclusion of a defeasible
inference rule. Once a label is assigned, traversal is terminated.
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Figure 2: D-ASPIC+arguments.
C2 8A0 2 Sub(A), if A0 is labelled s , then :9A00 2
Sub(A) such that A00 is labelled c and A0 2 Sub(A00).
We may write (; ; )A to denote a D-ASPIC+argument
A, where A0 2  iff A0 is labelled c , A0 2   iff A0 is
labelled s in A. Then com(A) =  and sup(A) =   are
the committed, respectively supposed, mfs of A. C2 then
states that no supposed X 2   is a proper sub-argument of
some committed Y 2 , since commitment to Y implies
commitment to all sub-arguments of Y . Also, for any set S:
SubCom(S) =
S
(; ;)X2S Sub()
denotes the sub-arguments of committed arguments in S.
Example 1. Let Rs = `CL, Kn = faccA; accBg, Kp =
fbgtg, Rd = faccA ) attA; accB ) attB; bgt )
:(attA ^ attB)g, where (letting X stand for A or B):
accX and attX respectively denote ‘paper accepted at con-
ference X’ and ‘will attend conference X’, and bgt denotes
‘budget’.
(fA1; B1g; ;; attA ^ attB)D in Fig. 2-i claims the in-
tention to attend A and B. (fC3g; fA1g;:attB)C1 and
(fC3g; fB1g;:attA)C2 , argue that the budget is insufficient
to attend both conferences, and supposing attendance at A
(respectively B), then one cannot attend B ( respectively A).
Definition 2. Let (; ; )X and (;; )Y be D-ASPIC+
arguments.
1) if  6= ?, then X attacks Y if X undercuts, rebuts or un-
dermines some Y 0 2  on Y 00 2 Sub(Y 0) (one can only tar-
get committed arguments). X defeats Y iffX attacks Y and if
the attack rebuts/undermines a contradictory then X  Y 00.
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2) if  = ? (X is a ‘falsum argument’) then X attacks Y on
any Y 0 2  \ Sub(). If  = ;, then X defeats Y . If  6= ;
then X defeats Y only if 9Y 0 2   \ Sub(), X  Y 0.
Intuitively, attacks and defeats of type 1 are defined as for
ASPIC+ arguments, except that the attack must target a fal-
lible committed sub-argument of the attackee. In Example 1,
C1 attacks D on B1, and defeats D on B1 only if C1  B1.
Likewise, C2 attacks D on A1, and defeats D on A1 only if
C2  A1. Notice that C1 (C2) does not attack C2 (C1) on
the supposed B1 (A1). For attacks from falsum arguments, if
 = ; then the attack amounts to a dialectical demonstration
that the supposed   are inconsistent, and so succeeds as a de-
feat independently of preferences; else success is contingent
on X  Y 0 for some Y 0 2   \ Sub(). Also, note that the
mfs of any given constructed argument can be differentially
labelled; this does not affect the strength of the argument:
Definition 3. Let be a strict partial ordering over some set
A of D-ASPIC+ arguments. Let (; ; )X 2 A. Then:
 [X] = f(0; 0; )X0 j0 [ 0 = [ , and Sub(X 0) =
Sub(X) g. 8Y;Z 2 [X] we say that Y and Z are logi-
cally equivalent.
 Henceforth we assume that  satisfies the following:
8Y 0 2 [Y ], 8X 0 2 [X] : Y  X iff Y 0  X 0
In general, when establishing whether Y is defended by
a set E of arguments (i.e., whether Y is acceptable w.r.t.
E), one commits to fallible arguments in E and Y . Hence
(; ; )X can then challenge (i.e., defeat) Y if X sup-
poses/concedes a subset   of these fallible arguments, argu-
ing that together with ,   neccessarily entails a claim that
conflicts with some fallible element in Y . Then, a defeat by
(; ;?)X indicates that the fallible arguments   committed
in E [fY g, together with , are inconsistent. Y should only
then be targeted if at least one of the committed arguments
in Y contributes to the inconsistency (i.e., is in  ). Only if
 = ; does the attack by X dialectically demonstrate that
E [ fY g has necessarily committed to (strictly entails) an
inconsistency, and so succeeds as a defeat independently of
preferences. As for arguments (X) deployed in challenging
Y , these are not required to define an admissible set; they are
countered on an individual basis. Hence Z 2 E can defend Y
if Z defeats X , while conceding only fallible arguments that
X commits to (i.e., sub-arguments of ).
Definition 4. Let (A;D) be a dialectical AF (DAF ) de-
fined by a theory T = (AS;K), where A is a set of D-
ASPIC+arguments, and D  AA is the set of defeats.
Then X defeats Y with respect to S  A, denoted X  S Y ,
if (X;Y ) 2 D and sup(X)  SubCom(S [ fY g).
 S is conflict free if 8Z; Y 2 S, Z 6 S Y .
 Y is acceptable w.r.t. S if 8X s.t. X  S Y , 9Z 2 S
s.t. Z )fXg X .
The extensions of (A;D) are then defined as in Section 2,
except in the case that S is stable, in which case we stipulate
that 8X =2 S:9Y 2 S s.t. Y  fXg X .
Consider Example 1, and suppose a dialogue in which the
acceptablity of D w.r.t. some set E, is challenged by a defeat
from either C1 or C2. Then C1  E D and C2  E D, where
C1 (C2) need not commit to A1 (B1), but rather supposes A1
(B1) only for the sake of argument, givenA1 (B1) is commit-
ted in D. The corresponding ASPIC+arguments, which do
not distinguish commitments from suppositions, illustrate the
foreign commitment problem [Caminada et al., 2014]: they
unnaturally have to commit to attendance at one of the con-
ferences (i.e., A1 or B1) in order to challenge the argument
D which claims that both conferences cannot be attended.
Let Rs = `CL, Kp = fp; p  :q; p  qg and A include
the D-ASPIC+arguments in Fig.2ii, as well as (fpg; ;; p)F ,
(fp  :qg; ;; p  :q)G, (fp  qg; ;; p  q)H . Now,
E cannot be admissible. This is because the inconsistency
of the premises p; p  :q; p  q is recognised by virtue
of constructing arguments with conflicting claims (X and
Y ). Then, intuitively, a minimal assumption on available
resources would be that resources suffice to combine the
mfs of these arguments to yield the falsum argument Z2 in
Fig.2ii. Then Z2  E X on F and G (since sup(Z2) 
SubCom(E [ fXg)), and Z2  E Y on F and H; Z2 is
moved to dialectically demonstrate that E commits to mfs
that strictly entail ?. These defeats succeed independently
of preferences. Z2 cannot be defeated as it has not commit-
ted to any arguments. Hence neither X or Y can be defended
and E cannot be admissible. Observe that unlike ASPIC+,
satisfaction of consistency in D-ASPIC+ does not: 1) assume
resources suffice to construct A, B and C (in Fig.1iv); 2) re-
quire that  satisfy the property of being reasonable.
Definition 5. Let (A;D) be a DAF . We define properties
that A may satisfy:
(P1) 8X 2 A : X 0 2 Sub(X) implies X 0 2 A.
(P2) 8X 2 A : X 0 2 [X] implies X 0 2 A.
(P3) If (; ;; ')X 2 A and ( ; ;;  )Y 2 A, and ' =   ,
then ( [  ; ;;?)Z 2 A.2
P1, P2 and P3 encode the assumption that resources suffice
to: (P1) construct all sub-arguments of a given argument X;
(P2) differentially label the mfs of a given argument X; (P3)
combine the mfs of arguments with contradictory claims, to
construct a falsum argument that strictly entails ?.
We now state satisfaction of the consistency and closure
postulates, having first defined the claims of arguments in an
extension E as the conclusions of arguments in E that make
no suppositions (intuitively, the argumentation defined infer-
ences are the conclusions only of arguments one commits to):
claims(E) =
S
(;;;)X2E 
Theorem 1. Direct Consistency: Let E be an admissible ex-
tension3 of a DAF (A;D). IfA satisfies P1, P2 and P3, then
8;  2 claims(E),  6= ? and  =2 .
Assuming only that A satsifies P1, one can also show that
for any complete extension E:
Closure under Strict Rules: If E contains arguments
A1 : : : An with respective claims 1 : : : n, and r = 1; ::
::; n !  2 Rs, and A includes an argument A that ex-
tends A1 : : : An with r so as to strictly claim , then A 2 E;
2Which given P2 implies that (;; [  ;?)Z0 2 A.
3Note: ASPIC+ only shows consistency for complete extensions.
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Sub-argument Closure: 8X 2 SubCom(E), X 2 E (every
sub-argument of a committed argument in E, is also in E).
The following key results that hold for Dung AF s, also hold
for DAF s: 1) Every admissible extension of a DAF is a sub-
set of a preferred extension; 2) Letting F(A;D) : 2A 7! 2A
be the characteristic function of a DAF (A;D), defined as
F(A;D)(E) = fX 2 AjX is acceptable w.r.t. E g, then there
exists a unique least fixed point of F(A;D) (the grounded ex-
tension of (A;D)).
4 Non-Contamination
Contamination may occur when the argumentation defined
inferences (the claims of justified arguments) of a theory T
are invalidated when ‘expanding’ the theory with syntacti-
cally disjoint domain specific information. That is, when the
defeasible rulesRd and premises (ordinary or axiom) K in T
are expanded to include premises R0d K0 and that are syntac-
tically disjloint from Rd and K. We now specify the notions
of syntactic disjointness and the expansion of a theory.
For any set of wff  in a language L, sym() denotes
the set of predicate, function and constant symbols in .4
Henceforth, for any 1, 2:
1k2 denotes sym(1)\ sym(2) = ; (i.e., 1
and 2 are syntactically disjoint)
When specifying the symbols appearing in premises and de-
feasible rules, we need to account for the names assigned (by
n) to these rules, as well as formulae declared to be in con-
flict (by  ). To illustrate the latter, suppose an argument X
constructed from T , where X includes the ordinary premise
married. Then, if bachelor =  married, bachelor should
be considered to be in the symbols of T , since an additional
argument claiming bachelor, constructed using K0 and R0d,
may attack X and so legitimately challenge the justified sta-
tus ofX . Henceforth, we write  2 r to denote that  appears
in the antecedent, or is the consequent, of a defeasible rule r.
Definition 6. Let con dr(r) = fn(r)g [ n(r)[S2r , and;
– conset(Rd [ K) =
S
r2Rd con dr(r) [
S
2K ;
– base(Rd [ K) =
S
2r;r2Rd [ K [ conset(Rd [ K)
Let T 0 be a D-ASPIC+ theory (AS0;K0), where
 AS0 = hL; ;R = Rs [Rd1 [Rd2 ; n0i;
 K0 = K1 [ K2
Then T = (hL; ;R = Rs [ Rd1 ; ni;K1) is said to be ‘ex-
panded by the syntactically disjoint (Rd2 ;K2) to obtain T 0’,
denoted T 0 = T  (Rd2 ;K2), iff 8r 2 Rd1 ; n(r) = n0(r),
and:
base(Rd1 [ K1)kbase(Rd2 [ K2)
Henceforth, we letA be the arguments constructed from T
and the preference relation  over A, and A0 the arguments
constructed from T 0 and the preference relation0 overA0. It
is straightforward to see that A  A0. Moreover, we assume
that preferences over arguments in A are unchanged when
incorporatingRd2 andK2 (i.e.,=0 \ AA). Let us now
revisit the example illustrating contamination in Fig. 1i):
4As usual, propositional atomic formulae are interpreted as pred-
icate symbols of arity 0.
Example 2. Let T be a theory s.t. L is a propositional lan-
guage, 8 2 L,  is a contradictory of :, Rs = `CL (T is
said to be a ‘classical propositional theory’), and:
 Rd1 = ft) sg, n(t) s) = r1, K1 = Kp1 = fq  :s; tg,
and = ;.
 Let T 0 = T  (Rd2 = fk; r ) pg; K2 = Kp2 =fk; r;:pg), where n0(t) s) = r1, n0(k; r ) p) = r2,0= ;.
Note that base(Rd1 ;K1)kbase(Rd2 ;K2). However, supposeKp2 had also included g, and g 2 r1. Then the respective
symbol bases would not be syntactically disjoint (the argu-
ment [g] : g would undercut an argument that uses t) s).
Fig. 2iii shows arguments A and A0 respectively constructed
from T and T 0 (note, we do not show these arguments with all
their differential labellings - i.e., their logical equivalents).
Observe that B is in the grounded extension of (A;D).
Now notice that A 2 A0 defeats B 2 A0. However, un-
like ASPIC+, B is still in the grounded extension E of
(A0;D0). Intuitively, given that resources suffice to strictly
extend A1 and A6 so as to explosively entail q, then re-
sources suffice to construct the corresponding falsum argu-
ment F = (;; fA1; A6g;?). Since F has empty commit-
ments, it cannot be defeated, and so F 2 E. Moreover, F
defends B 2 E since F )fAg A independently of prefer-
ences. Intuitively, F dialectically demonstrates that A is a
contaminating argument by stint of committing to inconsis-
tent fallible information (A1 and A6).
Example 3. Let T be a classical propositional theory, and:
 Rd1 = fe ) :sg, n(e ) :s) = r1, K1 = Kp1 = fe; sg.
Fig. 2iv shows arguments C, C1 and F . Let C  F .
 Let T 0 = T  (Rd2 = fg ) pg; K2 = Kp2 = fgg),
where n0(e) :s) = r1, n0(g ) p) = r2. Fig. 2iv) shows the
additional arguments D, C2 and C3. Let C 0 F , D 0 F .
Adding the syntactically disjoint (Rd2 ;K2) results in con-
tamination, since (as in ASPIC+) F is in the grounded exten-
sion of (A;D) but not (A0;D0). However, non-contamination
would be satisfied if adding syntactically disjoint information
to an argument does not change the strength of the argument.
Then one would have that D  F , hence D 6 E F , and so
F would be in the grounded extension.
Let us now more formally set out the conditions for satis-
faction of non-contamination. Firstly, the following can be
shown (in what follows we write DP(A) to denote the defea-
sible rules and premises in an argument A):
Definition 7. ` is a regular logic if it satisfies the following:
If   `  and 9    such that k  n  [ fg, then:
either  ` ? or   n ` .
Note, it is easy to show that classical logic is regular (see
Proposition 30 in [D‘Agostino and Modgil, 2018]).
Proposition 1. Let A be the arguments defined by a theory
(AS;K) such that Rs in AS encodes a regular logic `. Let
X 2 A such that conc(X) =  and   = DP(X), ; 6=    
and k  n [ fg. Then
(P4) Either 9X 0 = (;;?) 2 A such that DP(X 0) = ,
or 9X 0 = (;; ) 2 A such that DP(X 0) =   n.
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Henceforth we assume Rs is regular and that P4 is satis-
fied by the arguments constructed from a theory. That is to
say, given an argument of the form X in Proposition 1, re-
sources suffice to:
(i) construct the required X 0 with conc(X 0) = ?, if  is
inconsistent (in Example 3, A includes ‘inconsistent compo-
nents A1 and A6’ and so F 2 A0); or else
(ii) to construct X 0 with conc(X 0) = . In this case X 0 is
said to be the ‘non-redundant counterpart’ of X (in Exam-
ple 3, D 2 A0 and so resources suffice to construct its non-
redundant counterpart, i.e., C 2 A0).
In general, non-contamination is then satisfied if a non-
redundant counterpart X 0 is neither weakened or strength-
ened when adding syntactically disjoint information, to yield
the argumentX (see Definition 8). However, if T contains no
defeasible rules5 – i.e., T is a strict theory – then it suffices
that arguments are not strengthened. In general, whether or
not P4 can be satisfied with bounded resources, depends on
whether the proof-theoretical means used to obtain strict in-
ferences is such that given a proof of a conclusion that is syn-
tactically disjoint from the premises, we can feasibly (with
virtually no computational cost) turn it into a proof of ?
from the same premises. A classical natural deduction sys-
tem satisfying this requirement is presented in [D‘Agostino
and Modgil, 2018] and [D‘Agostino et al., 2019].
Definition 8. 8X;Y; Y 0 such that:
DP(Y 0) =  , DP(Y ) =  [  , and k  [ fg;
conc(Y 0) = conc(Y ) = , and 8r; r0 2  , r0 is a child
of r in Y 0 iff r0 is a child of r in Y 6
  is said to be non-strengthening if:
Y 0  X implies Y  X and X  Y 0 implies X  Y , and
  is said to be non-weakening if:
X  Y 0 implies X  Y and Y 0  X then Y  X;
Now, let the consequences of a theory T = (AS;K) be
defined as Cn(T ) = fclaims(E1); : : : ; claims(En)g, where
E1; : : : ; En are the complete extensions of the DAF (A;D)
defined by T . Also, let Cn(T )Sy denote the formulae in
Cn(T ) whose symbols are also in the set Sy. We now state
satisfaction of the first of the non-contamination postulates –
non-interference – studied in [Caminada et al., 2012].
Theorem 2. Non-Interference. Let T 0 = T  (Rd2 ;K2).
Assume that: 1) preferences are non-strengthening in the
case of strict theories, and both non-strengthening and
non-weakening in the case that theories include defeasible
rules; 2) the arguments A and A0 respectively constructed
from T and T 0, satisfy P1-P4. Then:
Cn(T )sym(Rd1 ;K1) = Cn(T 0)sym(Rd1 ;K1)
Intuitively, the above result follows from the result that
whenever (A;D) is defined by T and (A0;D0) is defined by
T 0, and T 0 = T  (Rd2 ;K2), then E is a complete extension
of (A;D) iff E0 is a complete extension of (A0;D0), where
5E.g., when D-ASPIC+formalises classical logic argumentation
with preferences as in [D‘Agostino and Modgil, 2018].
6r0 is a child of r inX iff r0 is the top rule of someX 0 2 Sub(X)
that is a proper sub-argument of an X 00 2 Sub(X) with top rule r.
E = E0 \ A. For brevity, we omit here the second non-
contamination postulate – crash resistance – which follows
straightforwardly from non-interference.
5 Conclusions
This paper is the first to study rationality under resource
bounds, in the context of general frameworks for struc-
tured argumentation. A number of works show satis-
faction of non-contamination for specific instances of AS-
PIC+. In [Caminada et al., 2012], propositional logic pro-
gramming and Default Logic instantiations of Dung frame-
works are shown to satisfy these postulates, but only un-
der the semi-stable semantics. In [Wu and Podlaszewski,
2015], non-contamination is shown assuming syntactically
restricted strict inference rules, no preferences, and frame-
works ‘cleansed of’ (excluding) inconsistent arguments.
[Heyninck and Straßer, 2017] prove all rationality postulates,
only for the grounded semantics, and for a version of AS-
PIC+ restricted to axiom premises, without undercuts, and
with preferences specifically defined by a weakest linking
lifting of a total ordering over defeasible rules (generalised
to preorders and a different lifting principle in [Heyninck and
Straßer, 2019]). [Borg and Straßer, 2018] study approaches
to structured argumentation that do not make use of pref-
erences, and that assume a single set of premises. In par-
ticular, they identify strict rules encoding ‘pre-relevant’ log-
ics as a sufficient condition for satisfying non-contamination
(note that classical logic is not pre-relevant, so that non-
contamination is only satisfied by cleansed frameworks). Fi-
nally, [D‘Agostino and Modgil, 2018] distinguish between
commitments and suppositions in the context of classical
logic argumentation with preferences. Full rationality is
shown under conditions analogous to P1-P4 (and without re-
quiring that one check that the premises of arguments are
consistent and subset minimal). Moreover, they consider the
use of a recently proposed natural deduction proof theory
for propositional classical logic [D‘Agostino et al., 2019],
which does not yield arguments that redundantly use syn-
tactically disjoint information. The use of such a proof
theory means that satisfaction of non-contamination is not
contingent on preference relations for strict theories being
non-strengthening. We believe it is straightforward to then
show that in the context of D-ASPIC+, if Rs is defined in
terms of the inferences licensed by such ‘non-contaminating
proof systems’, satisfaction of non-contamination can then be
shown assuming any preference relation.
To conclude, the D-ASPIC+framework for structured argu-
mentation is the first to establish: 1) conditions under which
non-contamination is satisfied for all complete semantics and
without compromising the generality of ASPIC+; 2) mini-
mally demanding requirements as to the resources available
for constructing arguments, that suffice to guarantee satisfac-
tion of all rationality postulates. This has significant impli-
cations for a wide range of existing and novel argumentation
formalisms and non-monotonic logics that can be formalised
in ASPIC+, rendering them more suitable for use by resource
bounded real-world agents engaging in epistemic reasoning
and decision making, either as individuals or via dialogue.
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